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Non-technical summary 
An impressive amount of literature shows that individual wages increase with 
education. Most contributions use so-called Mincer equations that relate 
numbers of schooling years and other individual characteristics to the 
individual wage level. The so-called wage curve literature demonstrates that 
the aggregate unemployment rate also has an impact on individual wages – if 
aggregate unemployment increases, individual wages decrease significantly. 
This paper shows that aggregate unemployment affects not only wages but 
also individual returns to education. On the basis of a theoretical model, we 
derive the hypothesis that the wages of less qualified employees are affected 
differently by changes in the unemployment rate than the wages of higher 
qualified employees. The main reasons for this are that on the one hand the 
employment opportunities and unemployment risks of higher qualified 
employees are better isolated against shocks on the labour market than those 
of less educated employees. On the other hand the wages of the higher 
educated may react stronger to changes in the business cycle because lower 
qualified employees rather leave the labour market than accept lower wages. 
In addition, the wages of higher qualified employees are rather subject to 
individual bargaining between employer and employee. Individual bargaining 
is more sensitive to the topical labour market situation. In contrast, collective 
bargaining wages are rather stable over time. 
From our model we conclude that we have to extend the standard Mincer 
regression to take into account an important factor for individual wages. We 
include regional unemployment and the interaction term between aggregate 
unemployment and individual education in order to avoid a misspecification. 
In our empirical analysis, we use representative individual data and regional 
panel variation in aggregate unemployment among different German regions. 
The results show that an increase in regional unemployment by one percent 
decreases returns to education by about 0.005 percentage points. The observed 
differences in the regional rates of returns can be almost fully explained by 
differences in the local labour market situation. This implies that empirical 
studies on returns to education should take aggregate unemployment into 
account. Especially international comparisons of the returns to education or 
comparisons of differents points in time could otherwise suffer from omitted 
variable bias if the unemployment situation differs strongly between countries 
or across time. 
We furthermore check the robustness of our results with respect to the 
empirical specification and the sample. We split our sample into males and 
females, East and West Germany, and employees with different tenure. In 
addition, we take into account unobserved heterogeneity between regions by 
using fixed effects in a two-step estimation procedure. We also allow for lags 
in the effect of unemployment on returns to education by including lagged 
unemployment variables. In addition we control for the endogeneity of the 
interaction term in the wage equation and instrument it accordingly by its 
lagged values. Finally, we also run quantile regressions in order to see if low 
wage earners are less affected than high wage earners. Only the upper wage 
quantiles experience a reduction in their returns to education if the regional 
unemployment increases. We find that males are stronger affected than 
females while the results on tenure are mixed. 
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Abstract 
On the basis of a theoretical model, we argue that higher aggregate 
unemployment affects individual returns to education. We therefore include 
aggregate unemployment and an interaction term between unemployment and 
the individual education level in a standard Mincer equation. Our results show 
that an increase in regional unemployment by 1% decreases the returns to 
education by 0.005 percentage points. This implies that higher skilled 
employees are better sheltered from labour market changes with respect to 
their jobs but encounter larger wage changes than less skilled employees. 
Differences in regional unemployment can in addition almost fully explain the 
observed large differences in regional returns to education. We use 
representative individual data and regional panel variation in unemployment 
between different German regions and for different employee groups. We 
demonstrate that our results are robust with respect to aggregation bias, time 
lags and potential endogeneity of the unemployment variable. 
 
JEL Codes: C23, J24 
Key Words: returns to education, unemployment, regional variation 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to Angel de la Fuente, Melanie Arntz, and Jens Suedekum for 
helpful comments. 
 1
1 Introduction 
Financial returns to education are usually measured on the basis of individual 
wage data (Mincer, 1974; Card, 1999). Traditionally, explanatory variables in 
these wage regressions are mainly contemporary individual characteristics 
such as age, qualification, tenure, or gender. In recent years, however, it 
became fashionable to include additional explanatory variables. Individual 
skill supply indicators, such as the continuing vocational training history and 
the labour market history are frequently added in wage regression. 
Alternatively, the so-called Mincer regression is extended by aggregate skill 
supply indicators, such as the regional quality of schooling (Campbell, 2001; 
Card and Krueger, 1992; Barro and Lee, 1996; Card, 1999). The inclusion of 
these additional explanatory variables often changes the returns to education 
coefficientsa and improves the quality of the estimation. This suggests that 
these covariates are essential in the elements of a properly specified Mincer 
equation. 
While skill supply measures are an important determinant of the value of 
human capital on the labour market, changes in skill demand are also 
supposed to play a major role. A positive shock in labour demand in a certain 
region or industry may increase employees’ bargaining power. Especially 
highly qualified employees or employees with key qualifications in this region 
or industry may profit from such a shock because firms may offer efficiency 
wages in order to bind employees with certain qualifications (Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1990). Therefore, labour market conditions have an impact on 
returns to education and aggregate unemployment influences employees’ 
wages differently, depending on their qualification. In this paper, we derive 
this hypothesis formally by expanding a standard wage bargaining model by 
differentiating between qualification levels.  
Our theoretical model therefore suggests that we also should include aggregate 
unemployment into the measurement of individual returns to education. So far, 
only rudimentary aggregate skill demand indicators, such as industry sector or 
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region, have been used in estimations of the individual returns to education 
literature, however. Hawley (2004) includes, for example, information on 
residence in a rural or urban area in order to control for the education 
expansion on the country side in Thailand and for the rapid economic 
development in the capital Bangkok and their effects on returns to education. 
Devereux (2005) shows that individual returns to skills depend on 
employment changes in industries and on the possibilities of employees to 
switch from a declining to a growing industry.  
There is a broad consensus that cyclical changes in returns to education are 
linked to shifts in skill demand and supply (Fuente and Ciccone, 2002). 
Several observers find that skill-biased technological change (Katz and 
Murphy, 1992; Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994; Acemoglu, 1998; 1999; 
Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Jacobebbinghaus and Zwick, 2002), the 
business cycle (van Ours and Ridder, 1995), globalisation (Wood, 1995) or 
capital-skill complementarities (Hamermesh, 1993) have an impact on 
changes in the skill wage mark-up. These papers usually discuss the change in 
returns to education on the aggregate level, i.e. for averages of distinct skill 
groups or income quantiles, or they use time series analyses or international 
comparisons. Consequently, changes in the composition of employee groups 
in age, experience, unemployment risk, or other individual characteristics 
cannot be taken into account (Fitzenberger, 1999). Former evidence suggests, 
however, that the composition and wage-relevant characteristics of the labour 
force change during the business cycle or they differ between periods, regions, 
countries or industry sectors (Devereux, 2005). In order to capture the labour 
demand effect on the returns to education correctly we therefore should use 
individual data. 
We seek to extend both strands of the literature – the individual returns to 
education and the macro-economic cyclical education wage mark-up literature 
– that so far seem to be unconnected. Our attempt is to link both strands by 
calculating wage returns of education on the individual level in order to avoid 
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composition bias. In addition, we add aggregate information on 
unemployment and its interaction term with education. Here we use the 
variation across a relatively short period of time and regions in Germany 
instead of international variation or long time series. The advantage of our 
regional approach is that, in comparison to international analyses, we reduce 
the impact of unobserved heterogeneity of labour demand and supply 
conditions such as different qualification systems, labour market policies or 
demand shocks between countries.  
The empirical contributions that are closest in spirit to our approach are part of 
the so-called wage curve literature (Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). These papers 
include regional unemployment in individual earnings equations in order to 
demonstrate that individual wages react to the regional labour market situation 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990, 1994; Card, 1995; Baltagi and Blien, 1998; 
Pannenberg and Schwarze, 1998; Büttner and Fitzenberger, 1998; Faggio and 
Nickell, 2005). We derive from our theoretical model that, in addition to the 
negative impact of aggregate unemployment on individual wages, an increase 
in regional unemployment reduces the returns to education in this region. 
Hence, the novelty of our approach is to include an interaction term between 
individual years of education and regional unemployment in our Mincer wage 
regressions. 
The theoretical model suggests that the impact of regional unemployment on 
individual returns to education differs among employee groups. We find that 
the effect should be stronger for males than for females, should decrease with 
tenure and should be smaller for the lower wage quantiles. We therefore 
distinguish between different employee groups in our regressions and find 
some empirical support for our hypotheses. In addition, we also take account 
of estimation problems encountered in our regressions. First, the impact of 
unemployment might be felt only in later years (Vilhubert, 1999). Second, 
unemployment and the interaction term between unemployment and education 
might be endogeneous. Third, there might be unobserved heterogeneity 
 4
between regions. Accordingly, we introduce an innovative two step estimation 
strategy which entails region fixed effects, lagged interaction terms between 
unemployment and education levels, and instruments. 
The paper proceeds as follows: on the basis of a wage bargaining model, the 
next section derives the hypothesis that aggregate unemployment has an 
impact on individual returns to education. In addition, we describe our data 
basis in the next section. Then we present our estimation strategy. In different 
specifications we take account of aggregation bias, time lags and potential 
endogeneity of the unemployment variable. The empirical assessment on the 
basis of German data shows that the level of unemployment indeed has an 
impact on individual returns to education. We also assess the estimation bias 
incurred if this is not taken into account. The last chapter concludes. 
2 Theoretical Background and Description of Data Set 
2.1 Theoretical Considerations 
In this paper, we integrate regional unemployment into the microeconometric 
literature on the individual returns to schooling. A large bulk of literature 
shows that individual employee characteristics such as experience, number of 
years in education and gender have an impact on individual earnings (Mincer, 
1974; Card, 1999; Kuckulenz and Zwick, 2003). Why should we also include 
aggregate unemployment and the interaction between unemployment and 
years of education in these estimations of the returns to education?  
The empirical wage curve literature consistently shows that regional 
unemployment has a negative effect on wages of all employees in the region 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). There are several 
convincing theories that explain the negative impact of the regional 
unemployment rate on individual wages based on individual maximising 
behaviour of employees or employers (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Card, 
1995 or Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). We show here that these models not only 
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predict a regional wage curve but with small extensions also can explain an 
impact of regional unemployment on returns to education. The mechanisms 
driving our results are similar to those in other standard models. Therefore we 
present a bargaining model in which unions and firms negotiate how to divide 
profits. 
A standard Nash-bargaining model (compare Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990) 
between employers and unions assumes the following utility function of the 
union: 
?(1 ) ,U L W LWυ υ= − +  
where L is the probability that the representative union member will be laid off 
(which is assumed to be random), υ-1 is the wedge between employers´ labour 
costs and post-tax wages, W is the bargained wage, and ?W  is the expected 
level of post-tax earnings available to a laid-off worker with: 
? ( )(1) 1 ( )(1 ) .W W p u Bυ υ= − −  
Here, B is the benefit replacement ratio and p(u ) is the period for which the 
worker remains unemployed. The profits of the firms are given by: 
,AN WNαΠ = −  
with N the number of employees and A a technical progress coefficient. The 
following Nash-maximand  
? * 1max (1 )( ) ( )L W W β βυ υ −⎡ ⎤− − Π⎣ ⎦  
can be maximized with respect to wage W, where β is the bargaining power of 
the union (or the discount rate of the employees). This leads to the following 
equilibrium wage: 
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Here, Fi is the first order derivative for argument i. From equation (2) it is 
straightforward that the aggregate unemployment rate has a negative impact 
on the bargained wage level.1  
We can easily derive different reactions to changes in the unemployment rate 
for different qualification groups from equation (2) if we take into account that 
wages and qualificational unemployment rates react differently during the 
business cycle. Please note that the returns to education decrease with the 
unemployment rate if the wages of lower skilled employees are less sensitive 
to changes in the unemployment rate than the wages of the higher skilled 
employees. Indeed, there are theoretical arguments for a more elastic and for a 
more inelastic reaction of unskilled wages during the business cycle. The 
simplest assumption within the framework of the bargaining model is that 
there are two unions representing low and high skilled employees and that low 
and high skilled employees work in different firms. In this case, the expected 
outside option of the employees according to equation (1) depends on the 
wage in other firms/sectors/regions W  multiplied by the aggregate 
unemployment rate.  
An argument for a stronger reaction of the unskilled bargained wages on the 
business cycle – or in other words an increase in the returns to education with 
the regional unemployment rate – is related to the relative employment rates 
by qualification. During depressions the employment rate of less skilled 
employees increases more than proportionally, while the unemployment rate 
of higher skilled employees is better isolated against the business cycle (Card, 
1995; Van Ours and Ridder, 1995; Reinberg and Hummel, 2002). A simple 
                                                 
1 Our empirical model estimates individual wage regressions including aggregate 
unemployment using fixed effects. Our observation period is rather short and therefore 
we assume that we can drop the assumedly virtually unchanged benefit replacement ratio 
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regression of the impact of aggregate unemployment on qualification-specific 
employment rates on the basis of the representative German Microcensus 
indeed shows a significant negative correlation that is steeper for high 
qualified employees than for low qualified employees (compare the 
descriptive analysis in Figure 1).2 A reason for a lower impact of aggregate 
unemployment on qualification-specific employment rates is that firms smooth 
employment of those workers with high turnover costs, while workers who are 
easier replaced suffer job losses during depressions (Oi, 1962; Mincer, 1991; 
Van Ours and Ridder, 1995; Card 1995). Labour turnover costs increase, for 
example, with specific human capital but also with general human capital if it 
complements specific human capital.  
The stronger fluctuation of the unemployment rate mirrors the findings of the 
stronger impact of the business cycle on the employment rate, compare 
Figures 2a and 2b for East and West Germany. This again empirically 
demonstrates that highly qualified employees are better isolated against 
changes in the business cycle in their unemployment risk than less qualified 
employees. Finally, the average unemployment period also is an element of 
equation (2) multiplied by u . We know that the average unemployment period 
of high skilled employees is clearly shorter than that of low skilled employees 
(Lauer, 2003; Wilke, 2004). These effects all lead to a stronger expected 
reduction of the outside option and as a consequence of the bargaining power 
of less qualified employees if unemployment increases. This means, however, 
that wages of low skilled employees should be more sensitive to changes in 
the aggregate unemployment rate. 
                                                                                                                                          
B, the technology parameter divided by the number of employees A/N1-α, the bargaining 
power of the unions β and the outside wage option u from our regression. 
2 The coefficient of the aggregate unemployment rate on the employment share of the low 
educated (no or lower vocational education) is -0.0085 while the coefficient for the high 
educated (tertiary or higher vocational education) is -0.0066, controlling for regions. Both 
coefficients are significant at the one percent level. The difference between the 
coefficients is significant at the ten percent level. 
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Figure 1: Correlation between aggregate unemployment and 
qualification-specific employment  
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Source: Microcensus, waves 1996-2000. 
Comments: The low educated include persons with no or lower vocational education (Lehre) 
while the high educated have tertiary or higher vocational education (Meister). The dotted 
lines stem from smoothed regressions. 
Besides the expected unemployment risk and duration, also the wage in other 
firms, regions or sector plays a role in the wage determination of our 
bargaining model, however. We argue that wages in alternative jobs for higher 
skilled employees are more elastic with respect to changes in the 
unemployment rate than wages for lower skilled employees. One reason might 
be that lower skilled employees are frequently subject to collective bargaining 
and wages of lower skilled employees are rigid with respect to changes in the 
business cycle (Krugman, 1994). Higher educated employees bargain directly 
with their employers and therefore their wages might be more closely related 
to the contemporary tightness of the labour market. While higher skilled 
employees might be better isolated against the business cycle in their 
unemployment risks, this may also lead to a stronger job competition on the 
 9
free jobs in times of oversupply. Accordingly, a stronger wage reaction during 
the business cycle for this group of employees is likely (Van Ours and Ridder, 
1995). Another reason for a stronger wage reaction of higher skilled 
employees to changes in labour market tightness may be relatively generous 
replacement rates for low skilled employees that induce this group of workers 
to leave the labour market instead of accepting a lower wage. 
Figure 2a:  Unemployment rates in Western Germany by qualifications 
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Source: IAB-Kurzbericht Nr. 9/2003 
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Figure 2b:  Unemployment rates in Eastern Germany by qualifications  
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Source: IAB-Kurzbericht Nr. 9/2003 
The empirical evidence on the impact of unemployment on the returns to 
education is incomplete and contradictory so far. In the wage curve literature, 
the impact of regional unemployment on wages is calculated for different 
qualification groups for example by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) and 
Baltagi and Blien (1998). The latter find a stronger negative elasticity of lower 
educated on employment changes for Germany for 1981-1990. Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994) also find this correlation for the US and Canada; for 
Australia and the UK they find a stronger negative wage elasticity for higher 
educated employees. In our approach we not only compare the wage 
elasticities of two or more distinct qualification groups with respect to regional 
unemployment, but also calculate the impact of unemployment on the returns 
to education for all employees. 
Our model assumes for simplicity that employees only differ with respect to 
education. In reality, female labour participation usually reacts stronger during 
the business cycle than male labour participation (Killingsworth, 1983). In 
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addition, females frequently follow males in their regional choices of jobs 
(Faggio and Nickell, 2005). Both effects might lead to a smaller impact of 
unemployment on female returns to education than on male returns.  
Card (1995) argues that the wages of more senior workers are better isolated 
against changes in the labour market. Therefore, we hypothesize that also the 
returns to education change less for higher tenured employees during the 
business cycle.  
Finally, we distinguish between different wage quantiles. We argue that 
employees at the lower end of the wage distribution rather leave the labour 
market if the unemployment increases than accept lower wages. This 
phenomen is especially virulent in Germany because the replacement ratio of 
unemployment or social benefits is rather high for lower wage groups. 
We do not use long time-series or international comparisons in order to prove 
our hypotheses but rely on the persistent and large regional labour market 
variation in Germany (OECD, 2000). The unemployment rate is significantly 
higher in Eastern than in Western Germany for the considered period of time 
(1996-2003). In the late nineties, unemployment increased drastically in the 
eastern states (from 14 to 18 percentage points), but only moderately in the 
western states (from 8 to 9 percentage points). The unemployment rate 
recently stabilized at around 7 percentage points in Western and at around 17 
percentage points in Eastern Germany (also compare Figures 2a and 2b). 
Disparities in economic indicators are not only found for Eastern and Western 
Germany but there is also variation across the German Länder within the two 
parts of the country (compare Figure 4 below for the variation in the 
unemployment ratio across the German Länder).  
Using the regional variation of the German labour market in order to examine 
the relationship between unemployment and returns to education has several 
advantages. First, by measuring changes in a short period of time, we can 
exclude that long-term external skill demand changes with skill biased 
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technological change. In addition, we can exclude that skill supply changes 
with changes in school quality or that changes in the skill composition of job 
seekers would confound the measured impact of changes in labour market 
conditions. Second, other studies face long time lags if they try to measure, for 
example, the effect of changes in school quality, skill demand changes 
induced by technological developments, migration or unemployment. These 
delayed effects do not play a role in our investigation. Third, by using regions 
within one country, we avoid measurement errors and data breaks that result 
from comparing different school systems, changes in classification criteria, 
different labour market institutions or unobservable country factors in 
international comparisons (de la Fuente and Doménech, 2006).  
2.2 Data 
Our main data source is the German Microcensus (MC) for 1996-2003. The 
microcensus is the official representative statistic of the population and the 
labour market, involving 1% of all households in Germany every year. The 
total number of households participating in the microcensus is about 370,000 
(encompassing 820,000 persons), including about 70,000 households (about 
160,000 persons) in the new Länder and the eastern part of Berlin.  
All households have the same probability of selection for the microcensus. 
Within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, sampling districts are 
selected in which all households and persons are interviewed. Every year, a 
quarter of all households included in the sample are replaced. This means that 
every household stays in the sample for four years. Household numbers are 
not included in the Scientific Use File. Hence, the microcensus cannot be used 
as a panel. 
The purpose of the microcensus is to provide statistical information on the 
economic and social situation of the population as well as on employment, on 
the labour market, and on education. The annual standard programme of the 
microcensus includes personal characteristics (age, sex, citizenship, etc.), 
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family and household context. In addition, we know the main and the 
secondary place of residence, whether the individual is employed, on job 
search, unemployed or out of the labour force. There is information on the 
number of children at pre-primary age, pupils, students in the household and 
information on individual general and vocational level of qualification and on 
the level of the individual and household net incomes. The microcensus is the 
data set which is most adequate for our research purpose because it combines 
two advantages: a huge sample size and a large number of covariates on the 
individual level. The following variables are used in our estimations: net 
income3, working time, qualification, job tenure, federal state (Land) the 
individual lives in, and personal characteristics (age and gender). 
By dividing net income by working time, we derive hourly income.4 This is 
important because annual working hours are highly correlated with 
contemporaneous unemployment rates and therefore lower wages due to 
reduced working hours might bias our results (Card, 1995). We construct the 
variable “years of education” by using the information on the highest degree 
of schooling and professional education. We take the standard lengths of all 
primary, secondary, and tertiary school qualifications (e.g. 5 years for 
attending university) and add them up accordingly for each person. The 
variable “labour market experience” is constructed by substracting the years of 
education plus 6 from age. Hence, we use a proxy for potential labour market 
experience because we do not have direct information on labour market 
experience. In addition, we have information on tenure at the current job. 
Besides the microcensus, we use the INKAR (an acronym for indicators and 
                                                 
3 Net income is given in intervals. We take midpoints of the categories. The problem of 
earnings information given in categories is less severe than it first seems. First, categories 
are quite small (e.g. 24 income categories in 2000). Second, individuals usually don't 
know exactly the monthly income and therefore, measurement error should not be much 
higher than in other data sets. 
4 We restrict hourly earnings to a maximum of 154 € and a minimum of 1.02 €. The upper 
limit affects only very few observations due to the categorical income variable and the 
lower limit affects less than 0.5 percent of the sample. 
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maps of regional development) database and data provided by the German 
Federal Statistical Office. The INKAR database is published yearly by the 
Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning in co-operation with the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the German states 
(Länder). It regularly and topically describes the situation of the regional 
development in Germany and Europe. It includes about 20 indicators on topics 
such as age and population structure, employment or unemployment. From the 
INKAR database, the variable “average yearly unemployment rate on state-
level” is used. 
3 Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
Figure 3 provides first empirical evidence on the impact of regional 
unemployment on the returns to education. It shows a simple descriptive 
correlation between the wages of employees with a low and a high 
qualification level with the regional unemployment in the period 1996-2003.  
The wages of higher qualified employees are on average more sensitive to the 
regional unemployment rate. This implies a decrease in the returns to 
education when unemployment increases. The increasing sensitivity of wages 
with skills to the regional unemployment rate is also corroborated in Figure 4. 
We present here descriptive evidence that regional unemployment has a 
negative effect on regional returns to education. We use cross section evidence 
on the correlation between the regional unemployment rate in the 16 German 
Länder and the individual rates of financial returns to education.5 This figure 
also highlights the large gap in the labour market conditions between German 
regions. 
                                                 
5 The financial rates of returns to education have been calculated according to the standard 
Mincer equation (4) shown below, also compare Table A6 in the appendix. 
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Figure 3: Correlation between aggregate unemployment and 
qualification-specific hourly earnings 
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Source: Microcensus, waves 1996-2003. 
Comments: The low educated include persons with no or lower vocational education (Lehre) 
while the high educated have tertiary or higher vocational education (Meister). The lines 
stem from linear regressions. 
In order to explore multivariate explanations for returns to education, we first 
estimate standard Mincer equations, i.e. individual returns to education for 
employees in the private sector for the year 2003 using weighted least squares: 
´
0 1 2(4) ,i i i iW educyears Xβ β β ε= + + +  
where Wi is the natural log of hourly earnings for individual i, educyears is the 
constructed number of education years, and X is a vector of additional 
covariates including experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared 
and gender.  
Then, analogously to the wage curve literature, we include the regional 
unemployment rate in the cross-section analysis in equation (4) in order to 
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show that the regional unemployment rate has a negative impact on wages 
(compare Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990). In the theoretical considerations 
above we argued that also an interaction term between years of education and 
the regional unemployment rate should be included here because different 
regional unemployment rates affect higher education groups in another way 
than lower education groups.  
If we include regional unemployment and the interaction term between 
unemployment and number of education years in the standard Mincer 
equation, our approach may suffer from so-called aggregation bias. 
Individuals in the same labour market may share some common component of 
variance that is not entirely attributable neither to their measured 
characteristics nor the regional unemployment rate (Moulton, 1990). This 
leads to a positive correlation of the error terms between members of the same 
regional labour market and an under-estimation of the standard-error of the 
covariates that are measured on the regional level. We allow for an 
interdependence of error terms at the state level and avoid a downward bias of 
the standard errors of aggregated variables (Moulton, 1986; 1990) by using 
cluster robust standard errors (White, 1980; Deaton, 1997) with Länder as 
clusters in estimating wage equations. 
Moreover, in order to check the robustness of our results, a possible 
aggregation bias and endogeneity of unemployment in the wage regression, 
we propose an innovative two-step model that allows us to identify time lags 
and to use fixed effects and instrumental variables. This allows lags in the 
effect of unemployment on the returns to education and controls unobserved 
heterogeneity between regions (such as investments in schooling, efficiency of 
schooling, other differences in the schooling system or in industrial policy). In 
the first step, individual returns to education for each state and year are 
estimated analogously to equation (4) in a pooled model for 1996-2003 
including regional and year dummies (but excluding the regional 
unemployment rate and the interaction between the unemployment rate and 
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years of education). In the second estimation step the regional unemployment 
and the interaction term explain the average regional returns from education 
that have been calculated from the individual returns (Lucifora and Origo, 
1999). Notice that in our two-step approach, the data have the same 
aggregation level in both steps and therefore aggregation bias is not an issue.  
We apply several robustness checks that are not possible in the one step 
specification. In the first specification of the two-step estimation, the regional 
unemployment rate explains contemporary average returns to education in the 
regions. The first version of the second step of the estimation can therefore be 
written as: 
( )1(5) ,jt t j jt jtR D U uτ γ= + + +  
where Rjt stands for the average returns to education on the state level from the 
first step regression according to equation (4). We have j=16 state dummies D 
and τ=8 time periods while Ujt represents the state unemployment rate at 
time t. In the following three estimations, we explain the yearly change in 
returns to education in order to eliminate time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity between Länder. We also include lagged returns to education in 
these estimations because there might be time lags between regional 
unemployment and financial returns to education. In the fourth estimation 
model, we control in addition for a possible simultaneity bias caused by the 
endogeneity of regional unemployment by using lagged variables as 
instruments (Baltagi and Blien, 1998).  
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Figure 4: Returns to education and unemployment rates, 2003 
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Key: Eastern states are represented by triangles, Western states by squares. The full names of 
the states can be found in Table A5. The results for the returns to education per state can be 
found in Table A6. The figure looks similar for any other year. 
Source: Microcensus, INKAR.  
 
One ongoing discussion surrounding the estimation of individual returns to 
education is the correction of estimates from the Mincer equation for 
measurement error in the education variable and a possible endogeneity bias 
of education (Card, 1995, 1999). Several authors propose the use of suitable 
instruments in order to reduce the measurement error and to correct for 
endogeneity. Our data set, the microcensus, does not offer promising variables 
which could be used as instruments in the individual wage equations. 
Moreover, our main interest lies in measuring the effect of local labour market 
conditions on the returns to education and not in calculating the precise value 
of the returns to education. When we assume that both - the measurement error 
in the education variable and a possible endogeneity bias - are not correlated 
with the local labour market conditions, the estimates of the interaction terms 
should be unbiased. Therefore, we refrain in this analysis from any attempt to 
correct the estimated effects of education for these well-studied biases – and 
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their fiercly debated correction strategies – and focus on regional 
unemployment as a determinant of the returns to education. 
3.2 Empirical Results 
Our Mincer-type regressions estimated according to equation (4) with cross-
section data of 2000 are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Mincer equations for the cross-section of 2003  
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 
Years of education 
0.0641*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0666*** 
(0.0020) 
Interaction U education - 
-0.0195*** 
(0.0044) 
Experience 
0.0143*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0177*** 
(0.0017) 
Experience ² 
-0.0003*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.00003) 
Tenure 
0.0164*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0144*** 
(0.0016) 
Tenure² 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
Male 
0.2138*** 
(0.0132) 
0.2070*** 
(0.0165) 
R² 0.0921 0.1131 
Observations 96939 96939 
Comments: Mincer equation for the cross section of 2003. Dependent variable is hourly net 
earnings. Specification (2) includes interaction term between regional unemployment, 
measured as percentage deviation from the mean, and years of education. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by sampling 
probabilities. Significance levels: * ten percent, ** five percent, *** one percent. 
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The estimates indicate that an additional year of education increases labour 
income by more than six percent. This is an estimate well-known from the 
empirical literature in Germany (Ammermueller and Weber, 2005; Steiner and 
Lauer, 2000) and other countries (Card, 1999; Harmon et al., 2001). If we 
include the interaction term between regional unemployment and years of 
education in this equation, we obtain significant negative effects of regional 
unemployment on the returns to education. This corresponds to our descriptive 
evidence and the theoretical argument that the wage bargaining power of 
skilled employees fluctuates stronger during the business cycle than the 
bargaining power of lower skilled employees. Keep in mind that we estimate 
all equations using the cluster command for regions in order to avoid 
aggregation bias. 
In order to have better information (more individuals in the sample) and to use 
additional variation in the time series dimension, we use the information of the 
years 1996-2003 from the microcensus. When all years of the microcensus are 
pooled, 792,889 observations are available. The estimation of the financial 
returns to education hardly changes when including all eight years. The time 
dummies indicate that average wages increased every year during our 
observation period. In column (1) of Table 2 we present a German wage curve 
on the basis of our data using the regional unemployment rate and excluding 
the interaction term between education level and aggregate unemployment. 
We obtain a negative, albeit insignificant, impact of the regional 
unemployment level on individual wages. The size of the coefficient is 
comparable to that found in the literature for Germany (Baltagi and Blien, 
1998; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). The interaction term is added in column (2) 
and is significantly negative. If we also include yearly state dummies in the 
Mincer regression in order to control for differences between the wage 
developments in the Länder in column (3), both size and significance level of 
the interaction term hardly change. Adding state-specific covariates to the 
equation, i.e. state-specific returns to education as well as returns to 
experience and tenure, leads to a decrease of the coefficient of the interaction 
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term, which is now just below the 10% significance level. The results indicate 
that an increase in the unemployment rate of one percent leads to a change of -
0.008 to -0.004 percentage points in the returns to education. This is 
comparable to the effect of an increase of one percentage point in the regional 
unemployment rate from 10 to 11 percent on the returns to education of -0.08 
to -0.04, i.e. from 7.00 percent to 6.92 or 6.96 percent, for example. 
Table 2: Mincer regressions for pooled data 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) (4) 
Years of 
education 
0.0693***   
(0.0016) 
0.0881***    
(0.0075) 
0.0882*** 
(0.0077) 
 
Regional U rate 
-0.0609   
(0.0656) 
0.0431   
(0.0603) 
  
Interaction U 
education 
 
-0.0083**   
(0.0030) 
-0.0083** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0043   
(0.0025) 
Controls:     
Individual ? ? ? ? 
Year and state ? ?   
State*year   ? ? 
State-specific 
covariates 
   ? 
R² 0.2256 0.2258 0.2305 0.2352 
Observations 792889 792889 792889 792889 
Comments: Mincer equations for the pooled data 1996-2003. Dependent variable is hourly 
net earnings. All specifications include an interaction term between regional unemployment, 
measured as percentage deviation from the mean, and years of education. Individual controls 
as in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. 
Estimations are weighted by sampling probabilities. Significance levels: * ten percent, ** 
five percent, *** one percent. 
 
Please note that we use state*year dummies as controls for the regional labour 
market situation in specifications (3) and (4) instead of the regional 
unemployment rate as proposed by several commentators in the wage curve 
literature. The state*year specific intercepts provide a better control for 
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differences across regional labour markets and over time and impose thus 
fewer restrictions on the estimated model. 
Further regression estimates are reported in the appendix. Table A2 presents 
the results for estimations by gender and region. For men, the interaction term 
is highly significant and slightly larger than in Table 2. No significant 
relationship between regional unemployment and returns to education is 
reported for women. This supports our hypothesis that females react stronger 
to changes in unemployment by leaving the labour market instead of accepting 
wage cuts, while males see their wages fluctuate stronger during the business 
cycle. If we separate our regressions between East and West Germany, a 
slightly significant influence of the regional unemployment rate on the returns 
to education can only be detected for West but not for East Germany. 
In Table A3, further interactions between the “years of education*regional 
unemployment” interaction term and tenure have been added to the wage 
equation. We expect a positive sign for the tenure interaction term because 
wages in internal labour markets should be less sensitive to cyclical shocks. 
The results are not clear-cut. When we include a linear interaction term, the 
coefficient is positive but not significant. It turns significant, however, once 
we add a squared interaction term. Using an interaction term between a 
dummy for having ten or more years of tenure and the interaction term 
between years of education and regional unemployment yields insignificant 
results.  
Further estimations to test the sensitivity of the results are presented in Table 
A4. The regressions according to specification (3) in Table 2 have been 
performed for commuters and non-commuters, i.e. people living and working 
in the same state. This is important because individual wages of the employees 
are connected with the unemployment rate of their place of residence. If they 
commute, their income is affected by a different labour market, however. The 
interaction effects are again negative and significant and slightly higher for 
commuters. 
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Finally, we include also unemployed persons in the regressions and use 
monthly income as the dependent variable (column 3). Thereby, we can test 
whether the composition of our sample biases the results. Our regular sample 
includes only employed persons and its composition is affected by the 
unemployment rate each year. By including both employed and unemployed 
persons, we avoid a possible sample selection bias. The drawback is that we 
can only use net monthly income as our dependent variable instead of the 
more precise hourly wages. The results in column (3) of Table A4 show that 
the interaction effect is highly significant again and even slightly stronger in 
absolute terms compared to the pooled regression results in Table 2.  
Finally we present the results of our two-step estimation procedure. In the 
second estimation step shown in Table 3, we first explain average regional 
returns to education by the regional unemployment rate. The contemporary 
regional unemployment rate is negatively related to returns to education on the 
regional level but does not have a significant impact. If we take unobserved 
heterogeneity of regions into account by using yearly changes in returns to 
education as the dependent variable in columns (2) to (4), regional 
unemployment has the significant negative influence we also derived in the 
one step models. The negative effect or regional unemployment on returns to 
education is persistent, compare column (3) – also lagged regional 
unemployment has a comparable impact on the returns to education (this is 
also found by Vilhubert, 1999 for Germany and Lucifora and Origo, 1999 for 
Italy). If we use the lagged unemployment rate as an instrument for 
contemporary unemployment in column (4), the regional unemployment 
coefficient is almost unchanged, while it turns insignificant.6 
                                                 
6 Using the lagged unemployment rate by one and two years is a strong instrument – the 
impact on contemporary unemployment is jointly significant at the one percent level, 
compare Staiger and Stock (1997). 
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Table 3: Results from two-step estimations 
Dependent variable Returns to 
education 
Yearly changes in returns to education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regional U rate 
-0.0035 
(0.0029) 
-0.0046* 
(0.0025) 
 
-0.0047 
(0.0032) 
Lagged regional U    
-0.0046* 
(0.0026) 
 
Controls:      
Year and state ? ? ? ? 
Lagged returns to 
education 
  ? ?   ? 
Yearly change in 
unemployment rate 
  ?  
IV lagged regional U    ? 
R2 0.8574 0.8131 0.8131 0.8131 
Observations  128 112 112 112 
Comments: Estimates of log regional unemployment rates in columns (1), (2) and (4) and 
lagged log unemployment rate in column (4) from second step regression. Returns to 
education are taken from first stage regression of log hourly earnings on state*year specific 
years of schooling variables, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared and 
gender, year and state dummies. Dependent variable: returns to education in column (1), 
yearly change in returns to education in columns (2), (3) and (4). Controls are year and state 
dummies in column (1), year and state dummies and lagged returns to education in column 
(2), year and state dummies, lagged returns to education and yearly change in unemployment 
rate in column (3), year and state dummies and lagged returns to education in column (4). 
Unemployment rate is instrumented by first and second lag of unemployment rate in column 
(4). Regressions are weighted by inverse of cluster robust standard errors of the returns to 
education in first stage. Significance levels: * ten percent, ** five percent, *** one percent. 
 
The two-step estimation results imply that a ten percent increase in the 
regional unemployment rate, e.g. from ten to eleven percent, leads to a 
decrease in the estimated returns to education by 0.05, e.g. from 7.00 to 6.95 
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percent. We prefer the lower estimate of the two step approach to the previous 
one step estimates from Table 2 because we can control better for 
heterogeneity across states now. 
Table 4: Results from two-step estimation for quantile regressions 
 1. Decile 2. Decile 3. Decile 4. Decile 5. Decile 
Regional U 
rate 
0.0006 
(0.0020) 
-0.0022** 
(0.0011) 
0.0008 
(0.0013) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0031*** 
(0.0009) 
Lagged 
regional U 
rate 
-0.0027* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0017 
(0.0013) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0025** 
(0.0010) 
 6. Decile 7. Decile 8. Decile 9. Decile - 
Regional U 
rate 
-0.0021* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0026* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0118** 
(0.0057) 
- 
 
Lagged 
regional U 
rate 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0027** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0041** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0084 
(0.0059) 
- 
Comments: Estimates of log regional unemployment rates in first row and lagged log 
unemployment rate in second row from second step regression. Dependent variable: 
Returns to education taken from first stage quantile regression of log hourly earnings 
on state*year specific years of schooling variables, experience, experience squared, 
tenure, tenure squared and gender, year and state dummies. Dependent variable: 
returns to education in first row and yearly change in returns to education in second 
row. Controls are year and state dummies in first row and year and state dummies, 
lagged returns to education and yearly change in unemployment rate in second row. 
Regressions are weighted by inverse of standard errors of the returns to education in 
first stage. Number of observations is 128 for first row and 112 for second row. 
Significance levels: * ten percent, ** five percent, *** one percent. 
 
We also estimate the impact of the regional unemployment rate and the lagged 
regional unemployment rate on the returns to education for the income deciles 
based on the individual first-step quantile regressions. We find that indeed the 
impact of the business cycle on the returns to education is somewhat lower for 
the first deciles than for the other deciles. This (weakly) supports our 
hypothesis that low wage earners in Germany rather leave the labour market in 
depressions than accept reduced wages. 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that the regional unemployment rate has a negative 
impact on the returns to education. Therefore, time-series analyses or 
international or regional comparisons of the financial effects of education 
should include the aggregate unemployment rate in order to avoid biased 
results.  
The significant impact of regional unemployment on individual returns shows 
that the wage situation of skilled employees is stronger affected by changes in 
the regional labour market than wages of unskilled employees. This is the 
consequence of a more sensitive wage bargaining position of the higher skilled 
during the business cycle. This is an important result because so far mainly the 
isolation of higher skilled employees from labour market swings with respect 
to their employment situation instead of their wages has been highlighted in 
the literature. We also show that returns to education for males are stronger 
affected from aggregate unemployment than those for females. The evidence 
on employees with different tenure is mixed. Lower wage quantiles are less 
affected – we interpret this as an indicator for a stronger inclination of low 
wage employees to leave the labour market instead of accepting lower wages 
in Germany. 
On average we find that an increase in the regional unemployment rate by one 
percentage point can explain a decrease in the financial returns of an 
additional year of education by around 0.005 percentage points. This is a non-
negligible impact in economic terms. If we compare the state with the highest 
unemployment rate, Saxony-Anhalt, to Bavaria, the state with the lowest 
unemployment rate during our observation period, regional labour market 
conditions can explain a difference in returns to education of 0.91 percentage 
points. In other words, if an employee moves from Saxony-Anhalt to Bavaria, 
he or she will, on average, encounter an increase in financial returns to an 
additional year of schooling of 14 percent. The observed difference in the 
returns to education between the two states is on average 0.89 percentage 
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points. Therefore, the estimated impact of the regional unemployment rate can 
almost perfectly explain the observed differences in the rates of return. 
We use regional information and official data that are representative for 
Germany in the period 1996-2003. We are striving to avoid measurement error 
by using hourly wages instead of monthly or yearly wages that are affected by 
changing working time during the business cycle. In addition, we find that our 
results are unchanged if including only employees who do not commute to 
another region or if including also the unemployed in our sample. We also 
take into account possible lagged effects of changes in regional unemployment 
on changes of the financial returns from one additional year of education. In 
addition, we use fixed-effects estimations to get rid of unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity between regions. Finally, we instrument the impact of 
unemployment on returns to education using the lagged values as instruments 
in order to avoid endogeneity. These specifications qualitatively produce the 
same results although the two-step estimates are smaller in absolute size than 
the estimates from the pooled model. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Ln hourly 
income 
2.03 
(0.50) 
2.04 
(0.49) 
2.06 
(0.49) 
2.08 
(0.50) 
2.11 
(0.51) 
2.26 
(0.75) 
2.31 
(0.75) 
2.32 
(0.74) 
Years of 
education 
12.29 
(2.34) 
12.37 
(2.33) 
12.43 
(2.37) 
12.38 
(2.38) 
12.41 
(2.38) 
12.46 
(2.40) 
12.53 
(2.48) 
12.62 
(2.56) 
Experience 22.04 (10.21) 
22.00 
(10.13) 
22.01 
(10.06) 
22.13 
(9.91) 
22.16 
(9.77) 
22.34 
(9.73) 
22.49 
(9.69) 
22.58 
(9.68) 
Experience² 589.76 (483.9) 
586.77 
(480.7) 
585.47 
(477.8) 
587.66 
(472.0) 
586.46 
(465.2) 
593.72 
(463.5) 
599.43 
(460.3) 
603.78 
(459.0) 
Tenure 10.56 (9.69) 
10.62 
(9.70) 
10.60 
(9.70) 
10.44 
(9.62) 
10.31 
(9.61) 
10.34 
(9.63) 
10.50 
(9.65) 
10.74 
(9.68) 
Tenure² 205.57 (323.2) 
206.96 
(326.4) 
206.37 
(326.9) 
201.56 
(321.8) 
198.72 
(320.1) 
180.12 
(301.6) 
165.30 
(287.1) 
153.55 
(273.5) 
Male 0.63 (0.48) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
Regional U 10.95   (2.94) 
12.15   
(3.91) 
11.10    
(3.56) 
10.85   
(4.11) 
9.61   
(4.32) 
9.59   
(4.47) 
10.15    
(4.33) 
10.85   
(4.36) 
Deviation of 
regional U 
3.08 
(27.65) 
14.37 
(36.83) 
4.47 
(33.52) 
2.10 
(38.70) 
-9.58 
(40.64) 
-9.80 
(42.08) 
-4.53 
(40.77) 
2.10 
(40.99) 
Observations 101603 100245 99470 100329 99285 103702 101922 98568 
 
Comment: Means are weighted by sampling probability, standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table A2: Estimations by region and gender 
 
 East West Men Women 
Years of 
education 
0.0732**   
(0.0241) 
0.0910***   
(0.0109) 
0.0934*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0627*** 
(0.0078) 
Interaction U 
education 
-0.0042 
(0.0080) 
-0.0091* 
(0.0046) 
-0.0084** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0024 
(0.0032) 
Controls:     
Individual ? ? ? ? 
State ? ? ? ? 
Year ? ? ? ? 
State*year ? ? ? ? 
R² 0.1901 0.2033 0.2484 0.1185 
Observations 161459 631430 489717 303172 
Comments: Mincer equation for the pooled data 1996-2003. Dependent variable is hourly net 
earnings. All specifications include an interaction term between regional unemployment, 
measured as percentage deviation from the mean, and years of education. Individual controls 
as in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. 
Estimations are weighted by sampling probabilities.  Significance levels: * ten percent, ** 
five percent, *** one percent. 
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Table A3: Estimations including interactions with tenure 
 
Tenure measure Linear Squared Dummy 
Years of education 0.0869*** (0.0072) 
0.0857*** 
(0.0071) 
0.0879*** 
(0.0076) 
Interaction U 
education 
-0.0085** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0102*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0083** 
(0.0030) 
Interaction U 
education*tenure 
0.00008 
(0.00006) 
0.00067*** 
(0.00008) - 
Interaction U 
education*tenure² - 
-0.000019*** 
(0.0000023) - 
Interaction U 
education 
*tenure>=10 
- - -0.0003 (0.0002) 
Controls:    
Individual ? ? ? 
State ? ? ? 
Year ? ? ? 
State*year ? ? ? 
R² 0.2306 0.2311 0.2305 
Observations 792889 792889 792889 
Comments: Mincer equation for the pooled data 1996-2003. Dependent variable is hourly net 
earnings. All specifications include an interaction term between regional unemployment, 
measured as percentage deviation from the mean, and years of education. Further interaction 
terms are between tenure and regional unemployment. Individual controls as in Table 1. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Estimations are 
weighted by sampling probabilities. Significance levels: * ten percent, ** five percent, *** 
one percent. 
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Table A4: Sensitivity estimations 
 
 Non-commuters Commuters 
Employees and 
unemployed 
Years of 
education 
0.0924*** 
(0.0073) 
0.1096*** 
(0.0067) 
0.1101*** 
(0.0089) 
Interaction U 
-0.0100*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0163*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0109*** 
(0.0035) 
Controls:    
Individual ? ? ? 
State ? ? ? 
Year ? ? ? 
State*year ? ? ? 
R² 0.2552 0.2606 0.3015 
Observations 402786 26411 954295 
Comments: Mincer equation for the pooled data 1996-2003. Dependent variable is hourly net 
earnings. All specifications include an interaction term between regional unemployment, 
measured as percentage deviation from the mean, and years of education. Individual controls 
as in Table 1. For the estimation using monthly income as the dependent variable (column 
(3)), both employed and unemployed persons are included in the regressions. The invidual 
controls include experience, experience squared and sex. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state level and reported in parentheses. Estimations are weighted by sampling probabilities. 
Significance levels: * ten percent, ** five percent, *** one percent. 
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Table A5: Names of the 16 German states and their abbreviations 
 
State Name Abreviation 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  BW 
Bavaria  BY 
Berlin  BE 
Brandenburg  BB 
Bremen  HB 
Hamburg  HH 
Hesse HE 
Lower Saxony NI 
Mecklenburg-Western Pom.  MV 
North Rhine-Westphalia  NW 
Rhineland-Palatinate RP 
Saarland  SL 
Saxony  SN 
Saxony-Anhalt  ST 
Schleswig-Holstein  SH 
Thuringia TH 
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Table A6: Returns to education by state for 2003 
 
State Returns to Education 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  .066 
Bavaria  .072 
Berlin  .058 
Brandenburg  .062 
Bremen  .051 
Hamburg  .065 
Hesse .069 
Lower Saxony .068 
Mecklenburg-Western Pom.  .064 
North Rhine-Westphalia  .067 
Rhineland-Palatinate .073 
Saarland  .073 
Saxony  .070 
Saxony-Anhalt  .061 
Schleswig-Holstein  .048 
Thuringia .050 
State-specific returns to education, estimated in a regression of log hourly earnings on state-
specific years of schooling variables, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, 
a gender dummy and state dummies in the cross-section of 2003. 
 
 
 
 
